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Introduction 
The Iranian government has been repeated criticized by the international community for the 
position it has taken in pursuit of nuclear technology. While many nations in the international 
community have warned Iran not to pursue such a course, Russia surprisingly has not. In fact, it 
has done just the opposite. Russia has openly admitted to supplying Iran with the technical 
capability to build a nuclear reactor and is one of Iran’s staunchest advocates in its quest to 
pursue such a course.[1] In doing so, Russia has blatantly ignored warnings by the international 
community with full knowledge that its actions could lead to damaged relations. This leads one to 
question Russia’s basic motives for doing so. Why has Russia defied international pressure and 
taken such an ardent stance in support of a “nuclear” Iran? Second, what does Russia stand to 
gain by maintaining relations with Iran? Third, what is the likelihood that Russia will curtail its 
relations with Iran as a way of appeasing the international community?  
While the threat of a nuclear Iran and its attempts to gain access to nuclear technology continue 
to make headlines in the United States and abroad, it is a serious mistake to focus strictly on Iran 
and overlook the role Russia has played in this process. The United States and the International 
community must take Russia seriously if they ever intend to develop a cohesive strategy for 
countering nuclear proliferation, especially with regards to Iran. Consequently, it is the specific 
intent of this article to do just this. I intend to show that the outlook for Russia’s continued 
cooperation with Iran is directly linked to their historical ties. This fact, coupled with Russia’s 
recent policies to solidify economic ties with Iran, provides sufficient evidence that cooperation 
will continue in spite of international criticism.  
To build my case, I will address Soviet/Russian-Iranian relations during these specific periods:  
1. First, I will describe the Soviet-Iranian relationship inherited by Russia before the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  
2. Second, I will address Russian-Iranian relations starting with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (December 1991) through December 1999.  
3. Third, I will address relations under the Putin administration (December 1999 to the 
present).  
4. Finally, I will conclude with a rationale for future cooperation.  
Only through a careful analysis of their past and present relations will it be possible to predict with 
some level of certainty the degree to which Russia will continue its staunch support for Iran.  
In view of their current level of cooperation on nuclear technology, Russia’s future relations with 
Iran is of extreme importance to the international community, especially the United States, as 
policies are developed to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The question then is whether 
or not U.S. policymakers will take Russia’s role seriously in the nuclear showdown with Iran? If 
economics is the significant motivating factor for cooperation, then the United States must offer 
Russia sufficient economic incentives to deter and or replace Russia’s dependence on Iran as a 
trading partner.  
Russia’s Inherited Soviet-Iranian Relationship  
Soviet relations with Iran during the Cold War years can be categorized as both opportunistic and 
circumstantial. They were opportunistic in the sense that the Soviet Union generally pursued 
relations that furthered its cause in checking the imperialist expansion of the west, and 
circumstantial in the sense that such attempts were often constrained as a result of domestic and 
international events. Although Iran typically aligned itself with the west during the Cold War, at 
least until the Revolution, its foreign relations were conducted in accordance with a “non-
alignment” policy. Basically, this policy meant Iran would pursue “tolerance and cooperation with 
all nations of good will,” which in reality gave it an excuse to pursue “opportunistic” relations with 
the Soviet Union.[2]  
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he began promoting his “new thinking” towards 
Soviet foreign policy. Although his policy towards Iran did not change substantially, he wanted to 
focus more on bilateral economic cooperation as a way to check the American military build-up in 
the Gulf.[3] Consequently, his “new thinking” also seemed to facilitate a change in Iran’s views 
towards the Soviet Union. Alternatively, this change could also be explained by Iran’s desperate 
need to rebuild its economy as a result of ongoing destruction caused by the Iran-Iraq War.  
So when Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Georgi Kornyenko visited Teheran on February 26, 1986, 
the Iranians were more than willing to negotiate some deals. They agreed to “expand economic 
and trade relations, and to conduct joint oil exploration in the Caspian Sea.”[4] In addition, Iran 
made a “friendly” move by agreeing to resume natural gas exports to the Soviet Union which had 
been halted in 1980. Consequently, Gorbachev apparently decided to tilt Soviet support back 
towards Iran in 1987, after previously favoring Iraq.  
While great strides had been made to improve relations, the events of the late 1980s appeared to 
eliminate all other major obstacles that had previously prevented cooperation. First, the Iran-Iraq 
war ended on August 20, 1988 after eight long years, countless deaths, and tremendous 
economic strain. Second, the Soviet Union started to pull out of Afghanistan in December 1988, 
an event that signified the end of Islamic oppression. With these two events behind them, the 
potential now existed for a new beginning. On February 26, 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze went to Teheran and was even afforded the opportunity to meet with Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Shevardnadze declared this to be a historic “turning point” in relations between the 
Soviet Union and Iran.[5]  
To fully comprehend the significance of this “turning point” in Soviet-Iranian relations, a couple of 
key points must be addressed. First, this was the first time a Soviet Foreign Minister had visited 
the Islamic Republic of Iran since the revolution, which effectively showed that Moscow was 
serious about improving relations. Second, Shevardnadze was received by Ayatollah Khomeini 
who had formerly denounced the Soviet Union as one of the “foreign devils” and who now called 
for “greater cooperation” against the “devilish acts of the west.”[6] Third, this visit was followed up 
in June 1989 with a trip to Moscow by Iranian Majlis Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani. While the 
invitation had been extended to Teheran for quite some time, it was finally accepted primarily due 
to decreased tensions over Afghanistan and Iran’s willingness to solidify relations. As a result of 
its war with Iraq, Iran desperately needed to rebuild its economy and its armed forces.[7] It is for 
this reason that the Soviet Union signed a number of major agreements with Iran to include the 
sale of arms. In particular, they agreed to provide Iran with “T-72 tanks, air defense equipment, 
sophisticated naval mines, MiG-29 and Su-24 aircraft, and ‘kilo’ class submarines.” In addition, 
they issued a joint communiqué stating that they had agreed to collaborate on the “peaceful use 
of nuclear energy.”[8]  
The events of the early 1990s also helped solidify the cooperative relationship between Iran and 
the Soviet Union. In particular, the United States military build-up and eventual Gulf War against 
Iraq created a security dilemma for Iran. During its war with Iraq, Iran had been fighting primarily 
with U.S. military equipment acquired during the Shah’s reign. However, Iran’s decision to turn 
against its “pro-western” stance after the revolution prompted the United States to terminate 
further sales of arms and parts. Following its war with Iraq, Iran’s military, particularly its air fleet, 
was severely degraded and in dire need of parts that were no longer able from the US. Even 
more, its western enemy now had a serious foothold in the Gulf as a res ult of Desert Storm. 
Consequently, these circumstances fueled Iran’s desire to regain its former military status in the 
Gulf as a means of defying the west while solidifying its dependence on Soviet military 
equipment.[9] Thus, the Soviets were more than willing to seal a one billion dollar arms deal with 
Iran in 1991.[10]  
December 1991 to December 1999  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia faced a totally new domestic and 
international system. It suddenly found itself surrounded by 14 new states, six of which were 
Muslim; Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan were located in Transcaucasia and Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan were located in Central Asia. The strategic importance of these states 
was of particular concern due to their proximity to both the Middle East and to Russia.[11] Over 
the years, Russia had worked extremely hard to establish good relations with Iran and the other 
nations in the Middle East. Now, the resurgence of Islam in these six states, coupled with an 
emergence of Islamic Radicalism, appeared to have given Moscow a much greater interest in 
seeking further cooperation with Iran.  
Russia’s initial fears about Islamic Radicalism in these six states were put at ease for two reasons. 
First, Russia knew the Communist oppression of Islam during the Soviet era had significantly 
weakened it as a religion and there was little fear that an Islamic style revolution could take root. 
The second reason was that Iran had not given Russia any reason to doubt its intentions to 
maintain cooperation as “good neighbors.” Iranian President Rafsanjani was extremely careful not 
to alienate Moscow while the Soviet Union was breaking up and kept their economic ties at the 
forefront while downplaying concerns over Islam. In fact, he did not even recognize the 
independence of Azerbaijan (declared in November 1991) until after the Soviet Union had 
dissolved, unlike his Turkish counterpart. As a result, Russia believed Iran was acting responsibly 
and felt it would be in its best interest to continue supplying Iran with arms and maintaining good 
economic relations.[12] For in so doing, it would help to reduce the possibility of Iran furthering its 
interests in the region on the basis of a shared Islamic heritage.  
While Russian and Iranian relations generally improved during the 1990s, its overall foreign policy 
under President Boris Yeltsin seemed inconsistent and disjointed. This was not totally 
unexpected considering that the 70-year old Soviet empire broke apart and somehow Yeltsin had 
to pick up the pieces and move forward. In general, his policies in the 1990s were aimed at 
improving relations with the west, maintaining relations with Iran in part to deter Iranian Islamic 
interests in Central Asia, generating hard currency from Arms and reactor sales, and to counter 
NATO expansion.[13] While Yeltsin’s policies may have been disjointed at times, it must be noted 
that he faced tremendous internal pressure from various parliamentary groups that helped sway 
the direction of his foreign policy.  
In 1992, Iran and Russia signed some contracts that would have a tremendous impact on their 
long-term relations. One of which was a significant arms contract valued between $4 billion and 
$10 billion dollars over the next five years. It appears that the items contained in this contract 
stemmed from the earlier 1989 agreement to sell arms, which consisted of three “kilo” class 
submarines, T-72 tanks, MiG 29 and Su-24 Aircraft, missile launchers and long-range guns. The 
second aspect of these contracts focused on Russia’s commitment to continue assisting Iran in 
the development of its steel and petroleum industries. Third, they signed an agreement to create 
a joint economic commission to further improve the economic aspect of their relationship. Finally, 
Iran reaffirmed its intent to approach Transcaucasia and Central Asian states “through the 
Moscow door” and not to promote Islamic radicalism there.[14]  
President Yeltsin was desperately trying to reform the Russian economy, which was reflected in 
much of his foreign policy. As previously mentioned, he wanted to improve his relations with the 
west in addition to maintaining relations with Iran. Even though he was criticized by the west for 
selling arms to Iran, the Russian economy was in dire need of hard currency and he knew Iran 
had it to give more than any other nation in the Middle East. In fact, Russian Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev visited the Gulf Cooperation Council in April 1992 and stated, “We have created a huge 
military-industrial complex. And now we need to find profitable markets for selling Russian 
armaments.” He went on to state that “We had to assert ourselves in the region, to show that 
Russia remains a great power that is prepared to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation, that 
it is not standing there with an outstretched hand.”[15] The bottom line is that the Russians 
discovered that selling arms was a very lucrative business and was an excellent means of 
generating the “hard currency” so desperately needed back home. So they sold as much as they 
could, but only to the extent that it did not permanently damage their relations with the west. 
While President Yeltsin tried to find a delicate balance between Iran and the west, his critics back 
home attacked him for being too “pro-western” and felt he should take a more independent policy 
towards the Middle East.[16]  
Although relations with Iran generally improved during the 1990s, the two countries did not 
always see eye to eye. The first such incident was President Yeltsin’s December 1994 decision to 
invade Chechnya. While Iran did react to this invasion and to the poor treatment of Muslims, its 
response was relatively weak which seemed to indicate a more pressing desire not to damage 
relations with Moscow. In fact, it probably had a lot to do with Moscow’s 1993 promise to sell 
nuclear reactors to Iran, which would satisfy a long-term desire to obtain nuclear technology.[17] 
This was followed by Russian contract in January 1995 to install an $800 million nuclear reactor 
at Iran’s Bushehr region.[18] This was a hot topic during the May 1995 Clinton-Yeltsin summit 
held in Moscow. In spite of President Clinton’s vehement criticism and concern over nuclear 
proliferation, Yeltsin would not back down on his commitment to sell nuclear technology to Iran.  
Yeltsin’s other motive was to use this strategic relationship with Iran as a means of countering the 
eastward expansion of NATO.[19] The boldness of President Yeltsin’s position in response to 
western pressure not only affirmed Russia’s commitment to maintain closer relations with Iran, 
but also gained him a “political victory” back home.  
Where hard-line critics claimed that he was too accommodating to western pressure, he used this 
situation as a way of “flexing” his political muscle back home. However, he did make some 
serious concessions to the west as indicated in a report published by the Heritage Foundation. 
The report states:  
Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on June 30, 1995 
signed a confidential agreement that was supposed to limit Moscow’s sales of arms to Iran. 
Russia agreed to supply only weapons specified under the 1989 Soviet-Iranian military 
agreements and promised not to deliver advanced conventional or “destabilizing” weapons to Iran. 
Finally, Russia agreed not to sell any weapons to Iran beyond December 31, 1999.[20]  
Although this may have seemed like a blow to Russian-Iranian relations, the Russian pullout from 
Chechnya in 1996 and the 1997 delivery of three “kilo” class submarines and numerous other 
arms sold to Iran in 1992 seemed to negate any potential fallout.[21]  
Surprisingly, the election of Muhammad Khatami as the President of Iran in May 1997 did have 
some effect on Moscow-Teheran relations as he opened up dialogue with the United States in a 
more liberal attempt at foreign policy.[22]  
As the 1990s drew to a close, Russian-Iranian relations were strained at times, but were 
generally considered strong due to their economic ties. The Russian economic crisis of 1998 
reaffirmed Russia’s desire to maintain all of its economic ties with Iran. This was especially critical 
since Iran had opened up dialogue with the west and Russia could not risk losing its economic 
foothold in the Middle East.[23] However, in August 1999, the Russians once again invaded 
Chechnya in an attempt to put an end to terrorist activities and Islamic extremism.  
This time, however, Iran “publicly” stepped up its criticism against Russian actions as the intensity 
of the conflict escalated. The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a public statement 
stating:  
The Islamic Republic of Iran, while honoring Russia’s territorial integrity, does not regard violent 
and hostile acts as a suitable way of dealing with recent incidents in Chechnya and Daghestan. 
The government and people of Iran cannot but deplore the continued armed operation by the 
Russian troops in the Northern Caucasus.[24]  
In response, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov “politely” responded in a similar statement that: 
“We are concerned over the attitude of Islamic countries to the events in Chechnya. However, it is 
a domestic Russian problem, and we intend to settle it independently, without any aid or 
interference.”[25] While Iran “publicly” acknowledged the injustices that were being done to the 
Muslims abroad, it knew that it could not sever ties with Russia, primarily due to its desire to get 
its Bushehr nuclear reactor completed in the years beyond 2000. Consequently, Russia had 
reasserted itself once again at the end of the 1990s as a great power by defying outside 
interference in its “domestic” affairs.  
December 1999-Present  
As 1999 came to a close, Russian-Iranian relations would take a turn for the better as Vladimir 
Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as the President of Russia. Putin’s actions were very clear and 
there was no mistake that he intended to maintain his close relations hip with Iran. While Yeltsin’s 
relations with Iran seemed to be politically motivated, Putin chose to emphasize relations with 
Iran as more of an economic business venture.[26] In addition, Putin also acknowledged that 
greater cooperation with the west was going to be necessary as he pursued economic relations 
with both Iran and the international community.[27]  
In November 2000, President Putin took a significant step towards boosting Russia’s relations 
with Iran by renouncing the 1995 “Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement” not to sell conventional arms 
to Iran.[28] This cleared the way for Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev to visit Teheran in 
December 2000 to discuss the resumption of arms sales. This trip was significant in that it was 
the first time a Russian Defense Minister had visited Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In 
sum, Sergeev and his counterpart discussed arms sales over a 10 year period valued at more 
than three billion dollars. In addition, Sergeev dismissed western pressure by indicating that 
Russia would conduct its affairs as a means to accomplish its own ends.[29]  
Following Sergeev’s visit to Teheran, Iranian President Khatami accepted Putin’s offer and made 
an official visit to Moscow in March 2001. Of particular importance, Khatami indicated his desire 
to purchase more diesel-powered submarines in an attempt to boost his naval power in the 
Gulf.[30] In addition, he also expressed interest in acquiring TOR-M1 surface-to-air missiles and 
possibly an additional nuclear reactor.[31] While this was good news for the Russians, they were 
again criticized by the west for considering sales of such type. For the Russians, it was purely a 
matter of economics (at least on the surface). They inherited a large arms industry from the 
Soviet Union and planned to use the revenue from military sales as a means to reinvest in 
advanced technology.  
 
While their economic ties continued to strengthen, Russia faced other events in 2001 that 
affected its foreign policies. The first event was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
U.S. World Trade Centers and Pentagon. In spite of his differences with the west, Putin reached 
out and embraced the American call to support a coalition against terrorism.[32] In some ways, 
this placed Putin in a precarious situation since the United States had labeled Iran as a member 
of the “axis of evil” due to its sponsorship of international terrorism.[33] Though he did not give in 
to western pressure, Putin did try to work a delicate balance between his relations with the west 
and Iran.[34] The second event was when Russia “officially” ended its second Chechen campaign 
and began pulling its troops out of Chechnya in December 2001. While it was a welcomed move 
by Teheran as a means or reducing tension over the treatment of Muslims, Russian troops still 
remain which could someday serve as an added source of friction between the two nations.  
In terms of their economic cooperation, the Caspian Sea has been both a region of great 
importance and a source of friction for Russia and Iran. In April 2002, Turkmenistan hosted the 
first summit of the Caspian nations in an attempt to gain resolution on how to divide its resources 
between the five bordering nations.[35] Although both Presidents Putin and Khatami were present, 
the summit did not produce any meaningful agreements on how the Caspian should be 
segregated. Iran, which only controls 13 percent of the Caspian’s shoreline, proposed that the 
division should be an equal 20 percent for each nation. Russia on the other hand, proposed a 
division based on their shoreline boundaries.  
 Without a full consensus on its division, it is unlikely that the vast resources of the Caspian will be 
unlocked by Russia, Iran, or the other three ordering nations.[36] In spite of this setback, Putin 
stated, “Russia's relations with Iran have strengthened, and he said Russia decided to participate 
in the Caspian summit after he talked to the Iranian leader during Khatami's recent visit to 
Moscow.”[37]  
Ties have also been solidified in other economic areas:  
1. First, the Bushehr nuclear reactor project is of strategic importance to both Russia and 
Iran; it has a large economic impact for Russia and has provided Iran with the nuclear 
technology it has been longing for. In response to western criticism, Iranian Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi invited the United States in June 2003 to take part 
in the building of its nuclear reactor as a means of alleviating tensions over the 
production of nuclear weapons. While the Iranian supreme leader may not allow it and 
the U.S. sanctions against Iran may not permit such contracts, the gesture seemed 
appropriate given the fact that the Bushehr Nuclear Reactor project was moving forward 
and both Russian and Iran wanted international support.[38]  
2. Second, an agreement was signed between Iran’s Automotive Industry Development 
Company and Russia’s Ulyanovsky Avtmobilny Zavod to export automotive parts to 
Russia on November 5, 2003.[39]  
3. Third, Russian, Iranian, and Azerbaijani railway executives signed an agreement in May 
2004 to build the Kazvin-Resht-Astara rail link to connect the three countries. In addition, 
Russia pledged to build a rail link through Azerbaijan and Iran that would connect Russia 
to the Persian Gulf. This rail link is expected to rival shipments through the Suez Canal 
and generate $10 billion revenues shared primarily between Russia and Iran.[40] Some 
of these agreements may not seem that significant, but they do serve as a sort of litmus 
test that reaffirms Russia’s commitment to improved relations.  
While their economic ties seem to be improving, clearly the capstone of their current economic 
cooperation centers on the construction of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr. 
 
After a meeting with Iran’s Security Chief, Has an Rowhani on February 18, 2005, Putin stressed 
to the international community that he was convinced that “Iran does not intend to produce 
nuclear arms.”[41] A few weeks later, Putin met President Bush at the Bratislava Summit and 
reiterated his unwavering support for selling nuclear reactors to Iran and also indicated his plans 
to visit Iran later in the year.[42] If and when this happens, it will be the first time that a Russian 
head of state visited Iran since before the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Immediately following this 
summit meeting, Russia signed an agreement to provide Iran with the nuclear fuel necessary to 
power the Bushehr reactor, with the stipulation that spent uranium would be returned to Russia as 
a means of negating the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons.[43] Thus, in the face of 
extreme international pressure to halt its cooperation with Iran on the Bushehr nuclear reactor, 
Russia has remained defiant. As will be discussed, this will likely serve as the basis for future 
cooperation.  
Conclusion: Outlook for Future Cooperation  
In spite of mounting international pressure over its nuclear reactor sales, Russia’s future outlook 
for cooperating with Iran appears promising. While looking at the “Russia” inherited by President 
Putin, the one thing that clearly stands out is its lack of hard currency. Consequently, it’s no 
surprise that reforming the Russian economy appeared to be one of Putin’s top priorities after 
taking over the Presidency. And how did he intend to do this? As any good businessperson would 
do after taking over a large corporation—streamline operations and improve profitability. In 
general, a new CEO might evaluate the assets on hand (inventory), look for possible markets to 
liquidate those assets (revenue generation), and then evaluate the profitability of various aspects 
of their business (streamlining operations). This is in essence the same strategy that President 
Putin employed in Russia. He knew Russia had inherited a tremendous industrial base from the 
Soviet Union, although aged, and planned to use it as a means of generating revenue. He also 
realized that there were some untapped markets, particularly in the Middle East where western 
influence was the weakest, that Russia could sell its arms and nuclear technology to. In pure 
economic terms, he has been following a basic formula of supply and demand.  
Coincidentally, it should be no surprise why Putin quickly pulled out of the 1995 Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement. Iran was not only a willing buyer of Russian goods, but generally had 
enough hard currency on hand to pay for the transactions. In addition, Putin’s unwillingness to 
back down from selling nuclear reactor technology to Iran can also be explained by his desire to 
maintain Russia’s economic ties with its “friendly neighbor” to the south. While criticism abounds, 
it should be noted that Russia does have a vested interest in preventing Iran from obtaining 
nuclear weapons. With its current missile delivery platforms, Iran could easily reach targets within 
Russia if it chose to do so. To make matters worse, the entire Gulf region would be destabilized if 
Iran had nuclear weapons. In fact, as stated in a Heritage Foundation Report:  
Some Russian officials, however, recognize that cooperation with Iran has its limits. As arms 
control expert Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, has warned, 
technology transfers to Iran may backfire. Within 10 to 15 years, he predicts, Russian technology 
could be used by radical Islamic terrorists or in Iranian, Algerian, Saudi, Egyptian, and Libyan 
missiles and other weapons aimed at Russia.[44]  
With concerns such as these, it appears that Russia does realize the inherent risks related to its 
reactor sales and will take great care to ensure that all spent uranium fuel is accounted for. In the 
meantime, Russia will continue to reap the economic benefits of its relations with Iran.  
By evaluating the economic data, it is easy to see how lucrative the Iranian markets are for 
Russia and their relative importance. In 2003, Russia was the second largest arms supplier in the 
world after the United States, bringing in nearly $4 billion in yearly sales. In addition, Russian 
nuclear technology and fuel generated equivalent sales through Russia’s nuclear agency, 
MinAtom.[45] Granted, not all of these revenues came directly from Iran, but these figures 
illustrate the significance that these types of markets have on the Russian economy. Thus, it 
stands to reason that Russia will continue strengthening its relations with Iran as long as the 
short-term benefits outweigh the risks associated with such a venture. This is especially true 
when one considers the great lengths at which Russia has gone to solidify its relations with Iran 
over the past few decades. If the United States is serious about preventing and or curbing Iran’s 
quest for nuclear weapons and/or technology, it must target these markets one by one and make 
cooperating with Iran less attractive. Money talks and this is appears to be one of the main 
reasons Russia continues to support Iran.  
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